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Abstract
This paper extends the differential game analysis of Engwerda et al (2002)
on the interaction between fiscal stabilisation policies in a two-country monetary
union. It considers the effect on the behaviour of authorities when there are coun-
try and/or union risk premia that depend on the fiscal position of both countries
in the monetary union. These effects are discussed in the context of a monetary
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authority adopting a fixed rate and a Taylor rule, respectively, for its monetary
policy. Noncooperative open-loop Nash equilibria and Pareto equilibria are com-
puted numerically for these cases and their adjustment dynamics compared.
JEL classification: C73; E61; E63; F42
Keywords: fiscal policy stabilisation, monetary union, risk premia, differential
games, Taylor rule
1 Introduction
In an era of increasing interdependence between economies, the interaction
between macroeconomic policies at the national and international levels has
taken on greater importance. For a monetary union, the issue of fiscal coor-
dination becomes considerably more important, given the presence of a com-
mon monetary authority which forces a greater degree of interdependence on
countries than would be otherwise. The experiences of the Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe provide a practical context for investi-
gating this type of policy coordination.
The emphasis by the European Central Bank (ECB) on price stability means
that short to medium term economic stabilisation comes to rest primarily on
the decentralised fiscal authorities. The stringent restrictions set down in the
Pact for Stability and Growth were meant to curb the pursuit of expansion-
ary policies by individual member countries. Nevertheless, the continuous
breaching of the deficit limit by the two largest EMU members, Germany
and France, led recently to the suspension of the sanction mechanism and
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has opened up the opportunity to revise the Pact to give member countries
greater fiscal flexibility.1 With this greater fiscal policy autonomy, coordi-
nation between member countries becomes even more crucial. Furthermore,
there is the issue of the European Union’s rapid enlargement towards the
east, with most newcomers expressing an eagerness to join the EMU once
they pass the convergence criteria. The increasing number and diversity of
members resulting from this expansion will make fiscal coordination more
demanding and a more pressing task for the union as a whole.
Given the interest in the experience of the EMU, it is not surprising that
the issue of macroeconomic policy coordination, particularly in the context
of a monetary union, has received considerable attention in the literature. Re-
cently, interest has emerged in studying the intertemporal aspects of policy
coordination through the use of dynamic game theory. Examples of this lit-
erature include Turnovsky et al (1988), Tabellini (1990), Levine and Brociner
(1994), Neck and Dockner (1995), Engwerda et al (1999, 2002) and van Aarle
et al (2001, 2002a and 2002b).
In relation to the model presented in this paper, the research undertaken
by Engwerda, van Aarle, Plasmans and others is the most important. They
adapt the models of Neck and Dockner (1995) and Turnovsky et al (1988) to
the context of a two-country monetary union to consider the coordination of
fiscal policies and fiscal and monetary policies. To solve the differential game
models resulting from this analysis, they employ the results and algorithms
1Under the Pact, Euro area members agree not to run budget deficits greater than 3
per cent of GDP. France and Germany will breach this ceiling for the third year in a row
in 2004.
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for algebraic Riccati equations developed in Engwerda (1998a, 1998b) and
Engwerda et al (1999). These papers also consider both noncooperative and
cooperative solutions, using the Pareto optimal equilibrium as the coopera-
tive solution concept.
Engwerda et al (2002) discusses a model where the monetary authority adopts
a fixed nominal interest rate rate. They find that increased fiscal stringency
requirements reduce the degree of fiscal activism and thus the degree of ef-
fective output and price stabilisation, leading to suboptimal macroeconomic
policies. Van Aarle et al (2001) find that when output is demand determined
rather than supply determined, stabilisation policies are more effective and
coordination and policy flexibility play a more important role. Partial coop-
eration, where two of the three authorities form a coalition against the other,
is considered in addition to fully cooperative and noncooperative scenarios
in van Aarle et al (2002b). There they find that the monetary authority has
a role to play where there are asymmetries between member states or when
it forms a coalition with a fiscal authority.
This paper extends this literature on the optimal fiscal policies within a
monetary union for the purposes of economic stabilisation and is innovative
in two dimensions. First it shows how capital market signals affect the out-
come of the fiscal coordination game between countries in a monetary union.
It then demonstrates how monetary policy rules, such as the Taylor rule, can
alter the distribution of welfare gains or losses between the member states.
Previous studies focus only on the interaction between the fiscal authori-
ties themselves or with monetary authority as well, with financial markets
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having no influence on the game. In this study, a market signal is introduced
into the model of Engwerda et al (2002) by incorporating risk premia into
the real interest rate equation. The risk premium for a country depends on
the budget balances of the country as well as the union a whole.2 A moti-
vating factor behind this specification of the risk premium is that countries
experiencing prolonged and large fiscal deficits can be seen as possessing a
greater downside risk, implying that investors demand a higher return as
compensation.
The monetary authority has been increasingly considered as an indispens-
able part of the game between the fiscal authorities. However, the treatment
of monetary policy in the game differs greatly among the previous studies.
The model of Engwerda et al (2002) assumed that the monetary authority
pursued a constant interest rate policy, regardless of the magnitude of infla-
tion or output deviations from trend. On the other hand, van Aarle et al
(2002b) introduced the monetary authority as a player alongside the fiscal
authorities. Here, a different setting is considered in which the monetary au-
thority adapts the Taylor rule as a guide in its conduct of monetary policy.
This is motivated by the widespread interest in the literature to use simple
policy rules, such as a Taylor rule, as an informal benchmark to evaluate
ECB policy.3
2An alternative avenue for introducing risk premia into the model would be through
interest rates depending on the level of public debt. However, debt does not appear
explicitly in this model, and the introduction of risk premia through debt would invoke
nonlinearities in the model dynamics. While the approach adopted here may not be as
attractive as the public debt option, it allows the linear-quadratic framework, and the
model simplicity that this entails, to be retained.
3Some recent examples of this literature include, among others, Eleftheriou (2003),
Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2003), Gerlach and Schnabel (2000), Gerlach-Kristen (2003) and
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This paper obtains several results with important policy implications. The
most striking is that the presence of union effects in the risk premia can,
under certain circumstances, induce outcomes similar to cooperation when
the fiscal authorities do not explicitly cooperate. In contrast, the presence
of country-specific risk premia reduces the effectiveness of the fiscal policies
in macroeconomic stabilisation and leads to larger welfare losses under both
the cooperative and noncooperative scenarios. Another major result of the
paper is that by employing a Taylor rule, a central bank can actively transfer
welfare losses between the member states in an asymmetric monetary union.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two details
the structure of the models considered in this paper - one where the mone-
tary authority employs a fixed interest rate rule and one where it uses Taylor
rule. Section three illustrates the results in the case of the fixed rate model,
with the results for the Taylor rule model contained in section four. Sec-
tion five concludes and proposes avenues for future research. The appendices
detail some important technical results used for the solution of the games,
namely for linear-quadratic differential games and their related algebraic Ric-
cati equations.
2 Macroeconomic Stabilisation Model
The macroeconomic model considered here is largely based on that of Engw-
erda et al (2002), which is a modified and extended version of the Mundell-
Fleming model. The model relates to a fully implemented monetary union
Sauer and Sturm (2003).
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Aggregate Demand
yi(t) = δis(t)− γiri(t) + ρiyj(t) + ηifi(t) (1)
Output Price Differential
s(t) = p2(t)− p1(t) (2)
Modified Fisher Equations
ri(t) = iE(t)− p˙i(t) + ϕifi(t) + ϑ(f1(t) + κf2(t)) (3)
Phillips Curve
p˙i(t) = ξiyi(t) (4)
Taylor Rule (for Taylor Rule model)
iE(t) = σ(pi1y1(t) + (1− pi1)y2(t)) + ²(pi2p˙1(t) + (1− pi2)p˙2(t)) (5)
Table 1: Structural equations for two-country monetary union model, i, j =
1, 2 and j 6= i.
with a single currency and central bank. The capital markets of the countries
are assumed to be fully integrated, while labour is immobile between the two
countries and labour and goods markets display sluggish adjustment relative
to capital markets. The economies’ business cycles are assumed to adhere to
the structure outlined in Table 1.
The deviation from trend of the logarithms of real output, the output price
level and the real fiscal deficit set by the authority are given by y, p and f
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respectively. The common nominal interest rate is denoted by iE and the
real interest rates in the countries by r1 and r2 respectively. In (3), the time
derivative of pi for i = 1, 2 represents the deviation from trend of the rate
of inflation for country i, while s is the logarithm of the intra-union real
exchange rate - a measure of competitiveness of country 1 with respect to
country 2.
The remaining equations presented for each economy are the aggregate de-
mand functions (1), the modified Fisher equations (3) and Phillips curve
relationships (4). The aggregate demand equations provided the major link-
age between the countries in the monetary union. Disturbances originated in
country i can be transmitted to country j through the presence of s and yi in
the equation for country j, where i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. The Phillips curve re-
lationships represent only short-run trade-offs between inflation and output,
and in the long run both economies adjust to a long run equilibrium where
output and prices are at equilibrium values. The modified Fisher equations
allow for the real interest rates in the two countries to deviate in the short
run. Such deviations are driven by differences in inflation and risk premia,
which are affected by the fiscal policies adopted by the two countries. In
the long run, real interest rates would converge as the inflation, while output
gaps and fiscal balances return to trend levels.
The modified Fisher equations distinguish the two influences on the risk
premium for a country. First, there is the component of the risk premium
stemming from the union’s overall position - the “union effect” - and reflects
the impact of one member state’s activities on the risk premium of the other
country. The “union effect” in the risk premium arises because the fiscal
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irresponsibility of one member state in the union will spill over to the other
member states. This may be through the other union members or central
bank acting or undertaking to bail out a financially troubled member state.
The second component of the risk premium is the country’s own fiscal posi-
tion - the “country effect”. In the union component of the risk premium, κ is
the weight given to country 2 in determining the overall position of the union.
This weighting would be determined by investors in the market and would
reflect aspects such as the relative sizes of the two countries, pre-accession
history and other institutional factors.
This model, as with that originally specified by Engwerda et al (2002), ab-
stracts from interactions the countries in the monetary union have with the
rest of the world, at least in terms of the real variables. While this simplifies
the analysis, it may bias of some of the model’s results. Since the behaviour
of the fiscal authorities is the primary interest, it is assumed that the com-
mon central bank has perfect control of the nominal interest rate. Two cases
of central bank behaviour are considered - one in which interest rates are
fixed at iE(t) = i¯E indefinitely and one in which interest rates are adjusted
according to the Taylor rule specified in (5). The former behaviour implies
that the monetary authority does not respond to the changes in fiscal policy
of the two countries. For the latter behaviour, the parameters of this rule are
assumed to be prespecified, meaning that the rule used cannot be considered
optimal. This is because the monetary authority is not considered a player
in the policy coordination game.
For the case where the monetary authority adopts a fixed interest rate pol-
icy, the output gap variables for each economy can be expressed in “reduced
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form” as a function of the competitiveness measure s, the nominal interest
rate iE and the fiscal deficits of the two countries using (1)-(4).
4 If a Taylor
rule is adopted by the common central bank, using (5) allows the output
gap variables to be expressed in terms of s, f1 and f2. The dynamics of
the competitiveness measure s can then be determined by taking the time
derivative of (2), substituting (4) for i = 1, 2 and then the “reduced form”
output gap equations to yield a first order linear differential equation. This
gives the state equation for the differential games considered below.
To fully specify the games, the objective functions need to specified. By
assuming that the objective functions are quadratic and the authorities have
an infinite planning horizon, the strategic interaction of the players can be
analysed as an infinite horizon linear-quadratic differential game. As in the
model of Engwerda et al (2002), the fiscal authorities wish to minimise the
following quadratic intertemporal loss function5
Ji =
1
2
∫ ∞
0
e−θit
(
αip˙
2
i (t) + βiyi
2(t) + χifi
2(t)
)
dt (6)
for i = 1, 2, where future losses are discounted at a rate θi.
6
Including the squared deviations from trend of the rate of inflation and the
logarithm of real output in the objective function is standard in the litera-
ture. The square of the deviation from trend of the logarithm of real fiscal
4Note that a money demand function does not need to be specified for this model,
unlike the claim made in Engwerda et al (2002).
5As with the output gap equations, this can be represented in “reduced form” as a
function of s, the fiscal positions of the two countries and, in the case of the fixed interest
rate rule game, iE .
6It is assumed that all parameter values in the loss function are nonnegative, so that a
greater penalty is received for larger deviations from trend.
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deficits is introduced by Engwerda et al (2002) to reflect the costs of high fis-
cal deficits. These include the crowding out of investment, debt accumulation
and servicing and financial sanctions or penalties imposed by the monetary
union. The parameter χ in the objective function reflects the importance of
this consideration to the fiscal authority. Squaring the fiscal balance variable
could be considered to be a mathematical convenience to conform to the
linear-quadratic framework, because surpluses and deficits are penalised in
the same way. However, as the focus of the model is on economic stabilisa-
tion, the pursuit of trend levels should be encouraged and penalising devi-
ations from trend in both directions is justifiable. An alternative economic
justification is that both deficits and surpluses imply an intergenerational
redistribution of income, which for given steady state growth rates and dis-
count rates would be undesirable.
This paper examines the dynamic adjustment process caused by an initial
disequilibrium in the intra-union real exchange rate (s(0) 6= 0) in both nonco-
operative and cooperative settings. The noncooperative equilibrium concept
employed here is the open-loop Nash equilibrium. These equilibria are de-
termined using the algebraic Riccati equation techniques and algorithms of
Engwerda (1998a, 1998b) and Engwerda et al (1999) which are described in
Appendix A. As in Engwerda et al (2002), the Pareto optimal equilibrium is
the cooperative equilibrium concept used here, which involves the maximi-
sation of a weighted social welfare function.7 A more detailed discussion of
the concept and solution procedure are given in Appendix B. While there
have been problems noted with this approach,8 and alternative cooperative
7In line with Engwerda et al (2002), the weight of country 1 is set by default to 1 while
that of country 2 is given by ω.
8See, for instance, Haurie (1976).
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equilibrium concepts have been proposed9, this concept is employed for con-
sistency with the previous literature. The application of these alternative
equilibrium concepts is left for future research.
3 Simulation Results for Risk PremiumModel
3.1 Baseline Model Results
The complexity of the models discussed in this paper does not permit analyt-
ical solutions to be obtained. Hence, numerical solutions are used to describe
the behaviour of the fiscal authorities. Engwerda et al (2002) note that their
model could admit either zero, one or two open-loop Nash equilibria for the
game. However, where two equilibria exist, it is not possible to discriminate
between these equilibria. Hence, this paper restricts its attention to cases
where a unique equilibrium can be obtained for the games.10
To enable a comparison of the results of this paper with those of Engwerda
et al (2002), the same baseline scenario is used. These parameter values,
reported in Table 211, impose symmetry on the model12, which greatly sim-
9For example, Filar and Petrosjan (2000) and Petrosjan and Zaccour (2003).
10Given the structure of the models, analytical results concerning conditions for no or
two equilibria to exist for the games were not able to be obtained. However, numeri-
cal results indicative of the parameter values where either situation can be obtained are
available from the authors.
11Given these parameter values, in particular the discount rate, one time unit could be
considered as being between one to three years.
12One consequence of this symmetry in the fixed interest rate model is that the dynamic
equation for s is independent of iE(t). Thus, the type of interest rate rule used does not
influence the outcome of the game, unless other asymmetries are introduced into the
framework.
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δi = 0.2 ηi = 1 βi = 5 ω = 1
γi = 0.4 ξi = 0.25 χi = 2.5 iE(t) = i¯E = 0
ρi = 0.4 αi = 2 θi = 0.15 s(0) = 0.05
Table 2: Model parameters for baseline simulation for i = 1, 2.
plifies the analysis, and ensures a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium exists
for the noncooperative case. Figure 1 shows the adjustment dynamics for the
noncooperative case (solid lines) and the cooperative case (dashed lines).13
The initial condition specified for the system reflects a real depreciation of
country 1 with respect to country 2. Ceteris paribus, country 1 would have
higher output relative to the trend, while country 2 would be below the trend.
Since economic stabilisation is the objective of both countries, they would
engage in anticyclical fiscal policies in an attempt to return output to trend
levels. Country 1 would thus have a tighter fiscal policy (f1(t) < 0), while
country 2 would pursue a looser policy (f2(t) > 0).
Another interesting feature of the model arises because the monetary au-
thority maintains a fixed nominal interest rate throughout the adjustment
process. Since output is higher for country 1 and lower for country 2, the
Phillips curve relationships imply inflation increases for country 1 and de-
13To allow the differences between the adjustment paths to be seen more easily and for
the variables to have a convenient economic interpretation, the graphs plot the adjustment
paths of the original forms of the variables. In Engwerda et al (2002), the graphs plot the
variables after they have been multiplied by the factor e−
1
2 θit - a transform necessary to
convert the discounted objective function into the standard linear-quadratic form. This,
however, makes the differences between the adjustment paths less discernable.
13
(a) (b) (c)
0 20 40 60 80 100
−0.007
−0.006
−0.005
−0.004
−0.003
−0.002
−0.001
0 
t
f 1(
t)
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
t
y 1
(t)
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
t
f 2(
t)
(d) (e)
0 20 40 60 80 100
−0.005
−0.004
−0.003
−0.002
−0.001
0 
t
y 2
(t)
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
t
s(t
)
Figure 1: Adjustment dynamics under noncooperative (solid) and coopera-
tive (dashed) fiscal policies.
creases for country 2. This lowers (respectively raises) the real interest rate
for country 1 (respectively country 2), so that the constant nominal interest
rate policy has an expansionary (respectively contractionary) effect. Thus
the central bank’s monetary policy is counter to the stance of the fiscal au-
thorities and is counterproductive towards attaining economic stabilisation.
The adjustment paths in Figure 1 illustrate the predicted results. Panel
(e) shows that the state variable, s(t), is stabilised faster under the cooper-
ative outcome than under the noncooperative outcome. Cooperation allows
some of the spillover effects to be internalised by the countries, making the
fiscal policies more effective and efficient. Under cooperation, the fiscal au-
thorities choose less activist policies as shown in panels (a) and (c), since
the authorities acknowledge that their fiscal policies are counterproductive
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to the strategy of their union partner.
Panels (b) and (d) show that reduced activism comes at the cost of increasing
deviation from trend in output in the short term - until about t = 30 in the
figure.14 This is expected because the domestic fiscal instrument has more
impact than the foreign fiscal instrument on domestic output, thus reducing
output fluctuations. However, the degree of output fluctuation under cooper-
ation diminishes faster and eventually becomes smaller than that experienced
under the noncooperative scenario.
3.2 Risk Premium Model Results
For illustrating the results of the risk premium model, the simulations pre-
sented here use the baseline parameters listed in Table 2 and the same real
exchange rate shock to the model as in the previous subsection. The addi-
tional parameters in the interest rate equation are considered for five different
scenarios outlined in Table 3.
Scenario A describes a situation where there are relative small symmetric
country effects and a small union effect that gives equal weight to both coun-
tries. In scenario B, there is only the union effect where the countries are
weighted equally. This scenario implies that capital markets treat the union
as a single entity as far as risk is concerned. On the other hand, scenario
C illustrates a case where only symmetric country effects are present. This
would arise if financial markets could perfectly distinguish between the bud-
getary positions of the countries. Scenario D shows an example where there
14The latter conclusion is not apparent from the examples in Engwerda et al (2002),
since the time axis used only includes up to t = 30.
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Scenario ϕ1 ϕ2 ϑ κ
A 0.4 0.4 0.6 1
B 0 0 1 1
C 1.5 1.5 0 1
D 1 0.3 0.5 1
E 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.25
Table 3: Interest rate equation parameters for simulations.
is a union effect that gives equal weight to both countries as well as asymmet-
ric country effects, while scenarios E illustrates the adjustment paths where
country effects are asymmetric and the union effect has different country
weights.
The adjustments paths corresponding to each of these cases are presented in
Figures 2-6. Comparing the adjustment paths for scenario A with those of
the baseline scenario, the fiscal authorities display less fiscal activism in the
situation where they face risk premium considerations in the noncooperative
framework. These differences are present in the cooperative framework but
are less discernable. Less fiscal activism by the fiscal authorities leads to
greater output fluctuations under both the cooperative and noncooperative
cases. This is highlighted by the crossover point on the graphs being at
around t = 60 in panels (b) and (d), rather than t = 30 for the baseline
simulation. Furthermore, the output price differential is reduced more rapidly
in both the cooperative and noncooperative frameworks, though particularly
for the latter framework. In terms of welfare losses, Table 4 shows that the
cooperative outcome yields higher costs for both players than for the baseline
16
Scenario Country Noncooperative Cooperative
Baseline 1 3.60 3.03
2 3.60 3.03
A 1 3.46 3.42
2 3.46 3.42
B 1 3.05 3.03
2 3.05 3.03
C 1 5.00 4.51
2 5.00 4.51
D 1 5.33 4.90
2 2.49 2.69
E 1 3.61 3.09
2 4.17 4.30
Table 4: Welfare losses incurred by players for different scenarios (all losses
to be multiplied by factor 10−4).
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Figure 2: Adjustment dynamics under noncooperative (solid) and coopera-
tive (dashed) fiscal policies under scenario A.
case and that the gains from cooperation are considerably smaller. These last
two findings appear to be reasonably robust to changes in the values of the
parameters.
Scenario B, illustrated in Figure 3, shows further considerable reductions in
fiscal activism, particularly for the noncooperative case. A distinctive feature
of this scenario is the similarly between the adjustment paths and welfare
losses for the noncooperative and cooperative equilibria. Furthermore, the
paths and welfare losses of the cooperative outcome in this scenario coincide
with those of the baseline case - a finding robust to changes in the parameter
values.
Further examination via sensitivity analysis shows that the welfare costs to
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Figure 3: Adjustment dynamics under noncooperative (solid) and coopera-
tive (dashed) fiscal policies under scenario B.
both parties for the noncooperative case indicate a form of parabolic depen-
dence on the parameter ϑ. For the baseline parameter values, as ϑ is increased
from zero towards about 0.9, the welfare costs in the noncooperative case de-
crease until they are identical to those for the cooperative case. For values of
ϑ larger than about 0.9, the welfare costs then start to increase again for the
noncooperative equilibria. Thus, for values of ϑ close to 0.9, the presence of
a union risk premium has the effect of forcing the authorities to behave in a
way similar to how they would if they explicitly cooperated. The implication
of this is that if investors price in the union risk premium appropriately, and
even though the countries act individually, they will be led towards behaving
as if they were cooperating. Such a result is important, as it implies that a
market mechanism can encourage cooperation-like outcomes, without forcing
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Figure 4: Adjustment dynamics under noncooperative (solid) and coopera-
tive (dashed) fiscal policies under scenario C.
cooperation on the players through formal agreements.15
In scenario C, when only “country” effects are present in the interest rate
equations, sharp differences emerge between the adjustment paths of the
cooperative and noncooperative approaches. Fiscal activism for the non-
cooperative case is prevalent, even more so than in the baseline scenario,
primarily because the domestic fiscal instrument is now less effective in cor-
recting output gaps. Both countries experience modest output fluctuations,
though these are slightly larger than in the baseline case. In contrast, the
cooperative solution shows the member states refraining from fiscal activism
while experiencing larger output fluctuations and a rapid decline in the out-
15Such agreements would be costly, as they would require negotiation and the develop-
ment of new institutional arrangements.
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Figure 5: Adjustment dynamics under noncooperative (solid) and coopera-
tive (dashed) fiscal policies under scenario D.
put price differential. As in scenario A, the cooperative outcome leads to a
considerably faster rate of decline in this differential. Comparatively high
welfare losses are sustained by both countries for the noncooperative and
cooperative solutions - a result driven by the decreased effectiveness of their
domestic fiscal instruments.
Scenario D is the first case examined where asymmetry is present, with the
effects readily seen in Figure 5 and Table 4. Both countries display less fiscal
activism under the cooperative outcome, though panels (a) and (c) show that
the difference is greater for country 2. Country 2 also displays more fiscal
activism than country 1 in the noncooperative solution, while this situation
is reversed for the cooperative solution. This can be attributed to the higher
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value of ϕ1 relative to ϕ2, which renders the domestic fiscal instrument of
country 1 less effective in influencing output fluctuations. In most respects,
the patterns in the other panels are similar to those described in scenario
A. However, the output fluctuations are larger in magnitude, particularly for
country 1 with its less effective domestic fiscal instrument.
The higher value of ϕ1 drives the higher welfare loss for country 1 under
both the noncooperative and cooperative scenarios shown in Table 4. In
contrast, the welfare losses for country 2 in the noncooperative case is con-
siderably below the baseline case values, though this loss increases under
cooperation. To ensure country 2 would be no worse off under cooperation,
they may attempt to obtain a larger value of ω. This, however, would reduce
the gains from cooperation for country 1.
The adjustment paths for scenario E show similar patterns to those of sce-
nario B. Fiscal activism is higher and output fluctuations are lower, at least
at the commencement of the adjustment paths, for the solution under the
cooperative framework. The degree of fiscal activism is noticeably lower un-
der the noncooperative solution and higher for the cooperative solution for
country 2, relative to the baseline scenario. This is influenced by the greater
sensitivity of the real interest rate of country 2 to its own budget balance.
Similar to scenario B, the adjustment of the output price differential is faster
under the noncooperative solution than the cooperative solution. The wel-
fare losses, however, are larger than for scenario B, particularly for country
2. Furthermore, since the welfare loss increases for country 2 under cooper-
ation, a higher value of ω than that used here would be needed to encourage
cooperation.
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Figure 6: Adjustment dynamics under noncooperative (solid) and coopera-
tive (dashed) fiscal policies under scenario E.
When examining the welfare losses for the five scenarios shown in Table 4,
those losses sustained under the cooperative outcome are generally lower and
less volatile compared with the costs incurred under the noncooperative out-
come. This in itself provides some incentive for cooperation, because the
parameters in the interest rate equation are governed by the choices of in-
vestors and in reality may change over time.
Overall, it can be seen that incorporating risk premia into the interest rate
equations provides for a richer model of fiscal policy coordination. However,
thought needs to be given to the parameters in the interest rate equations
and their impact on the solution, since it is possible to obtain economically
implausible results if interest rates are made too sensitive to risk premia.
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Scenario σi ²i pii
E1 0.2 2 0.5
E2 2 2 0.5
E3 0.2 2 0.3
Table 5: Taylor rule parameters for simulations, i = 1, 2.
4 Taylor Rule Model Simulation Results
An important consideration with the introduction of a Taylor rule is that the
interest rate policy rule will only affect the outcome of the game if the coun-
tries are asymmetric.16 This has been considered for the simulations in this
section by choosing the parameters of scenario E from the previous section.
The next three figures illustrate the different effects on the adjustment paths
of the solutions of changing the Taylor rule parameters. The parameters used
are reported in Table 5.
One aspect apparent from the plots is that the adjustment path of the output
price differential is largely unaffected by the introduction of the Taylor rule,
something concurred by comparing panel (e) in Figures 7-9 with that in
Figure 6.17 Another interesting aspect is that the optimal fiscal policies in the
cooperative case do not appear to be greatly influenced by the specification
of the Taylor rule, whereas the differences between the optimal policies for
16If the countries in the game are symmetric, the nominal interest rate drops out of the
reduced form model for an arbitrary policy rule. This implies that monetary policy will
have no influence on the strategies pursued by the fiscal authorities.
17The value of the feedback constant, the scalar equivalent of the eigenvalue of the
closed-loop matrix which governs the speed of adjustment in the output price differential,
only varies in the fourth decimal place over the four simulations.
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Figure 7: Adjustment dynamics under noncooperative (solid) and coopera-
tive (dashed) fiscal policies under scenario E1.
the noncooperative solution are more noticeable. In the noncooperative case,
fiscal activism in country 1 (respectively country 2) decreases (respectively
increases) with higher values of σi and increases (respectively decreases) with
lower values of pii.
From panels (b) and (d) of Figures 7-9, the output gaps for both countries are
smaller for the cooperative solution than for the noncooperative solution for
an initial period of time. This contrasts with scenario E, where this is only
the case for country 2. Increasing the weight on the output gaps and reduc-
ing the weight on country 1 in the Taylor rule both result in greater output
fluctuations for country 1 and lower fluctuations for country 2. This result,
however, is driven by the nominal interest rate variable, which is lower than
trend in the three simulations. The reason for the rate being below trend is
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Figure 8: Adjustment dynamics under noncooperative (solid) and coopera-
tive (dashed) fiscal policies under scenario E2.
the lower degree of fiscal activism in country 2 relative to country 1, which
drives larger output fluctuations in country 2 relative to country 1.
The interest rate set by the monetary authority, illustrated in panel (f) of
the figures, does appear to play some role in governing the output and fiscal
balance dynamics of the two countries. Its impact on the noncooperative
solutions seems to be significantly greater than for the cooperative solutions.
In scenarios E1 and E2, introducing the Taylor rule and subsequently in-
creasing the weight given to output deviations leads to noticeable increases
in fiscal activism for country 2, while country 1 decreases its activism. This
translates into substantially greater output fluctuations for country 1 and
marginally lower fluctuations for country 2. On the other hand, increasing
the weight of country 2 in the central bank’s Taylor rule in scenario E3 results
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Figure 9: Adjustment dynamics under noncooperative (solid) and coopera-
tive (dashed) fiscal policies under scenario E3.
in the fiscal activism of country 2 being reduced and the activism of the fiscal
authority of country 1 rising. This is attributable to the central bank favour-
ing the economic stabilisation of country 2 with its looser monetary policy
due to its greater sensitivity of its real interest rate to its fiscal balance while
being counterproductive towards the aims of the fiscal authority of country 1.
Another part of the analysis where fiscal cooperation appears to play a role is
in its impact on the welfare losses of the two countries, which are reported in
Table 6. In the three Taylor rule simulations, the costs are effectively being
transferred from country 1 to country 2 through cooperation, since there is
only a small change in the total losses for the union as a whole. The main
beneficiary from cooperation is country 1, while the welfare losses for country
2 increase under cooperation in scenarios E1 and E3. Thus, country 2 would
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Scenario Country Noncooperative Cooperative
E 1 3.61 3.09
2 4.17 4.30
E1 1 3.71 3.28
2 4.06 4.09
E2 1 3.79 3.44
2 3.98 3.91
E3 1 4.32 3.66
2 3.49 3.68
Table 6: Welfare losses incurred by players for different scenarios (all losses
to be multiplied by factor 10−4).
seek to increase its weight in the joint loss function so that it would not be
worse off under cooperation.
On the other hand, comparing scenario E with the simulations in this section
shows that the introduction of the Taylor rule allows the transfer of losses
from country 2 to country 1 under noncooperation and cooperation. Mone-
tary policy is looser than would be the case under scenario E, which favours
the adjustment of country 2. This looseness, however, is counterproductive
for country 1 by providing greater stimulatory effects than under scenario
E, which produces an increase in the country’s output fluctuation relative to
scenario E. These patterns are enhanced when in scenario E3 the monetary
authority places more weight on country 2 in the determination of the union
level of inflation and output gaps. However, should the authority place more
weight on country 1 in the Taylor rule, this may lead to monetary policy
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favouring country 1,yielding the opposite results.
Overall, the introduction of the Taylor rule to the determination of iE(t)
allows welfare losses to be transferred between players. While the total cost
to the union of correcting the output price differential is affected, the effect is
small compared with the magnitude of the welfare transfers induced. Intro-
ducing the rule, however, does not seem to allow the welfare losses of both
players to be reduced simultaneously and can therefore only be seen as a
means of redistributing welfare costs.
5 Conclusion
This paper has extended the analysis of a differential game of macroeconomic
stabilisation using fiscal policies in a two-country monetary union. In partic-
ular, it has considered the effects of incorporating risk premia into the model.
Of significant importance is that unlike the model of Engwerda et al (2002)
on which this paper’s framework was based, the effect of asymmetries on the
optimal policy choices has been examined.
From the model on risk premia, some general conclusions can be drawn. The
presence of “union effects” in the risk premia have been shown, under certain
circumstances, to induce behaviour under the noncooperative scenario sim-
ilar to that undertaken when the authorities cooperate. This is important,
as it provides a market mechanism that may encourage behaviour similar
to cooperation without requiring the explicit agreements, costly bargaining
or institutional arrangements associated with formal cooperation. On the
other hand, the presence of country-specific effects in the risk premia reduce
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the effectiveness of fiscal policies in economic stabilisation and lead to larger
welfare losses under the cooperative and noncooperative cases. Furthermore,
if the central bank employs a Taylor rule in an asymmetric monetary union,
welfare losses can be redistributed relative to the fixed interest rate policy.
Whether this increases or decreases the asymmetry of the distribution of wel-
fare losses depends on the specification of the rule and how the asymmetries
arise.
In terms of some policy implications that arise from the model, there are
some key aspects of relevance to current policy in the EMU. In particular,
the presence of union effects in the risk premia may provide a market mecha-
nism to moderate fiscal activism in the union in response to macroeconomic
shocks. If this is the case, mechanisms such as the Stability and Growth
Pact may be less crucial for encouraging fiscal cooperation and restraint in
national fiscal policies. However, such results appear to depend on having a
reasonably large, though not excessive, union component of the risk premia.
If these effects are small, there may still be a role for institutions.
The imposition of a Taylor rule may also seems attractive as a way to redis-
tribute the costs of stabilisation. The rules considered here, however, are not
necessarily “optimal”, since the central bank is not treated as a player in the
game. Employing such a rule may in fact lead to greater inequality in the
distribution of welfare losses, dependent on the parameters chosen. Further-
more, the implementation of such a redistributive arrangement could prove
difficult for countries incurring larger welfare losses from the redistribution.
However, by demonstrating that such transfers can be achieved theoretically,
this is still of interest, despite the obvious problems in implementing this in
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a monetary union such as the EMU.
In terms of future research, there are several avenues that could be examined.
From an applied perspective, the addition of the monetary authority into the
game as a player, the introduction of a “third country” outside the union,
including a government budget constraint and constraints on the strategies of
the players are all potential extensions. From a game theoretic perspective,
the investigation of alternative noncooperative and cooperative equilibria,
the examination of trigger strategy equilibria and the design of mechanisms
to implement cooperative equilibria would be other ways to extend the model.
Given that the EMU is still in its infancy, this area of research is likely to
remain of interest to academics and practitioners, which should allow further
investigation of these models.
A Algorithms and Results for the Noncoop-
erative Case
The following section details the results of Engwerda (1998a, 1999b) and
Engwerda et al (1999) concerning the determination of open-loop Nash equi-
libria for two player linear-quadratic differential games.18 It is assumed that
the players attempt to minimise their individual quadratic performance cri-
terion through the manipulation of their controls of a single system of linear
differential equations. Only the initial state of the system is known to the
players, implying that their actions are functions of time and require com-
mitment from the players to that time path for the duration of the game.
18Some statements in these papers have been corrected and justifications for the modi-
fications are available from the authors.
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The system to be controlled is given by
x˙(t) = Ax(t) + B1u1(t) +B2u2(t), x(0) = x0 (7)
where x is an n dimensional vector describing the state of the system with
initial state x0, ui is a m dimensional control vector able to be manipulated
by player i = 1, 2, with A and Bi being constant n× n and n×m matrices
respectively.
The performance criteria to be minimised by player i, i = 1, 2 is
Ji(u1, u2) =
1
2
x(tf )
TKifx(tf ) +
1
2
∫ tf
0
x˜(t)TFix˜(t) dt (8)
where x˜(t) =
(
x(t) u1(t) u2(t)
)T
,
Fi =

Qi Pi Li
P Ti R1i Ni
LTi N
T
i R2i
 (9)
is a positive semidefinite matrix, Kif is positive semidefinite and Rii is posi-
tive definite for i = 1, 2. Under these assumptions, both cost functionals, Ji
for i = 1, 2 are strictly convex functions of ui for all admissable controls uj
(j 6= i) and all initial states x0. These assumptions allow the first order con-
ditions from Pontryagin’s minimum principle to be necessary and sufficient
for obtaining open-loop Nash equilibria.
The approach offered by Engwerda (1998a, 1998b) and Engwerda et al (1999)
is to construct a set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations to solve the in-
finite horizon differential game. To do this, only control paths which yield
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finite costs to both players are considered. For this set to be nonempty, the
pairs (A,Bi) for i = 1, 2 are assumed to be stabilisable - conditions sufficient
to guarantee the path of the dynamic equations is bounded. Furthermore,
it is assumed that Qi is positive definite with respect to the controllability
subspace of (A,Bi) for i = 1, 2 and that the open-loop equilibrium strategies
allow for the system to be described by a feedback synthesis. The following
theorem discusses conditions for finding stabilising solutions of the differen-
tial game and relates this to the solution of the algebraic Riccati equations
associated with this problem. This also corrects some of the statements made
in Engwerda et al (1999).
Theorem 1 Consider the coupled algebraic Riccati equations in matrices K1
and K2 by0
0
 =
−AT 0
0 −AT
+
P1 L1
P2 L2
G−1
BT1 0
0 BT2
K1(t)
K2(t)

+
K1(t)
K2(t)
−A+ (B1 B2)G−1
P T1
LT2

+
K1(t)
K2(t)
(B1 B2)G−1
BT1 0
0 BT2
K1(t)
K2(t)

+
P1 L1
P2 L2
G−1
P T1
LT2
−
Q1
Q2
 (10)
where G is defined as
G =
R11 N1
NT2 R22

and assumed to be invertible. Then the infinite planning horizon two-player
linear-quadratic differential game has, for every initial state x0, an open-loop
Nash equilibrium strategy
u1
u2
 if and only if there exist K1 and K2 that
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solve the algebraic Riccati equations (10) and yield eigenvalues of
Acl = A−
(
B1 B2
)
G−1
P T1 +BT1 K1
LT2 +B
T
2 K2
 (11)
which all situated in the open left half complex plane. An open-loop Nash
equilibrium strategy is then given byu1(t)
u2(t)
 = −G−1
P T1 +BT1 K1
LT2 +B
T
2 K2
Φ(t, 0)x0
where Φ(t, 0) satisfies the transition equation Φ˙(t, 0) = AclΦ(t, 0) subject to
the initial condition Φ(0, 0) = I. The coupled AREs have a real solution
(K1, K2) if and only if K1 = Y X
−1 and K2 = ZX−1 for some
K = Im

X
Y
Z
 ∈ Kpos
where Kpos is the collection of M invariant subspaces
Kpos =
K ∈M
inv|K ⊕ Im

0 0
I 0
0 I
 = R3n

with M is defined as
M =
−A+
(
B1 B2
)
G−1
PT1
LT2
 (B1 B2)G−1
BT1
0
 (B1 B2)G−1
 0
BT2

Q1 −
(
P1 L1
)
G−1
PT1
LT2
 AT − (P1 L1)G−1
BT1
0
 (P1 L1)G−1
 0
BT2

Q2 −
(
P2 L2
)
G−1
PT1
LT2
 (P2 L2)G−1
BT1
0
 AT − (P2 L2)G−1
 0
BT2


(12)
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Furthermore, under the open-loop Nash equilibrium strategy, the spectrum of
the closed-loop matrix Acl coincides with σ(−M |K), that is the spectrum of
the restriction of the linear transformation induced by M to the subspace K.
The costs obtained by using this strategy for the players i = 1, 2 are given
by 1
2
xT0Mix0, where Mi is the unique positive semidefinite solution of the
Lyapunov equation
ATclMi +MiAcl +
I
−G−1
PT1 +BT1 K1
LT2 +B
T
2 K2
T
Fi

I
−G−1
PT1 +BT1 K1
LT2 +B
T
2 K2

 = 0
(13)
Using the above results and some additional results discussed in Engwerda
(1998a, 1998b) and Engwerda et al (1999), a numerical algorithm has been
developed to determine whether an open-loop Nash equilibrium exists for
the game and compute the strategies if such equilibria exist. Provided that
Qi is positive semidefinite, Rii positive definite and (A,Bi) is stabilisable for
i = 1, 2, the following procedure can be used to determine equilibria for the
infinite horizon game.
1. Calculate the matrix M using (12).
2. Compute the spectrum of this matrix. If the number of positive eigen-
values of M , counted with their algebraic multiplicities, is less than n,
then a stabilising solution for the closed-loop system cannot be found.
3. Calculate all M invariant subspaces K ∈ Kpos such that Re(λ) > 0 for
all λ ∈ σ(M |K). If the set is empty, a stabilising solution cannot be
found.
4. Let K be an arbitrary element of the set determined in the previous
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step. Calculate three n× n matrices, X, Y and Z, such that
Im

X
Y
Z
 = K
Defining K1 = Y X
−1 and K2 = ZX−1, an open-loop Nash equilibrium
strategy is given byu∗1(t)
u∗2(t)
 = −G−1
P T1 +BT1 K1
LT2 +B
T
2 K2
Φ(t, 0)x0
Here Φ(t, 0) satisfies the transition equation Φ˙(t, 0) = AclΦ(t, 0) with
initial condition Φ(0, 0) = I, where Acl is the closed loop matrix defined
in (11) whose spectrum equals σ(−M |K). If the set determined in the
previous step contains more elements, then this process can be repeated
for each different combination to calculate different equilibria for the
game.
From the perspective of implementing the procedure, the arbitrary elements
of the invariant subspaces can be formed by combining n of the eigenvectors
of M corresponding to its positive eigenvalues to form a matrix. Partition-
ing this matrix into three n×n matrices stacked vertically, and provided the
first of these is invertible, the solutions K1 and K2 to the coupled asymmetric
Riccati-type equations can be determined.
Engwerda (1998b) notes that while the algorithm may provide infinitely
many different solutions for Ki, the eigenvalues of Acl can take on at most(
2n
n
)
different structures. Further, Engwerda et al (1999) states that where
players discount their losses by a sufficiently large discount factor, a unique
equilibrium can usually be obtained.
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B Adaptation for the Cooperative Case
The cooperative solution concept adopted here and in Engwerda et al (2002)
is the Pareto equilibrium. The optimal policies are chosen to minimise
JC = J1 + ωJ2 (14)
where ω reflects the relative weight attached to the losses of both players,19
subject to the dynamics specified in (7). This transforms the problem from
a linear-quadratic differential game to a linear-quadratic regulator problem.
Therrefore, a single Riccati equation can be constructed and a variant of
the algorithm presented in the previous section can be adopted in order to
determine the equilibrium.
Formally, the problem of interest can be specified as minimising
JC(u1, u2) =
1
2
∫ ∞
0
x˜(t)TWx˜(t) dt (15)
where x˜(t) is as defined earlier and W is a positive semidefinite matrix par-
titioned as
W =
Q S
ST R
 (16)
The matrix R is a symmetric, positive definite, and thus invertible, 2m×2m
matrix, S a n× 2m matrix and Q a symmetric n×n matrix. In terms of the
19As noted in Engwerda et al (2002), the choice of ω could be assumed to arise from the
outcome of an earlier bargaining problem the two players have solved to determine their
relative weights in the joint loss function. Under these circumstances, the Nash-bargaining
solution could be considered as the most natural outcome to such a bargaining problem
associated with the decision process.
37
matrices defined in the previous section, these can be written as
Q = Q1 + ωQ2
S =
(
P1 L1
)
+ ω
(
P2 L2
)
R =
R11 N1
NT1 R21
+ ω
R12 N2
NT2 R22

Under the assumptions stated previously and that (A,B) is stabilisable and
(Q,A) is detectable, the strategyu1(t)
u2(t)
 = −R−1 (ST +BTK)x(t) (17)
will be a unique Pareto equilibrium for the game20, while the algebraic Riccati
equation is given by
KBR−1BTK−K(A−BR−1ST )−(A−BR−1S)TK−(Q−SR−1ST ) = 0 (18)
The minimal total cost is given by 1
2
xT0Kx0, where x0 is the initial state of
the system. Furthermore, the costs of the individual players can be com-
puted similarly to (13) by replacing Acl with A − BR−1
(
ST +BTK
)
and
−G−1
P T1 +BT1 K1
LT2 +B
T
2 K2
 with −R−1 (ST +BTK).
From a computational standpoint, the algorithm discussed earlier can be
adapted to solve for the Pareto optimal equilibrium. The relevant matrix
here is H, defined as
H =
−(A−BR−1ST ) BR−1BT
Q− SR−1ST (A−BR−1ST )T
 (19)
20Standard results from the theory of algebraic Riccati equations show that the solution
for K will be unique and positive semidefinite, which implies the uniqueness of the Pareto
optimal equilibrium.
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This has n unstable and n stable eigenvalues, implying a unique solution to
the H invariant subspace in K exists, which is associated with the eigen-
vectors corresponding to all the eigenvalues with positive real parts. By
considering the alternative decomposition into two matrices, X and Y , such
that
Im
X
Y
 = K (20)
then using K = Y X−1 yields the Pareto efficient equilibrium strategy noted
in (17). Furthermore, the spectrum of the closed-loop matrix
A−BR−1 (ST +BTK) (21)
corresponds to that of σ(−H|K), implying that the solution will be stabilising.
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